About
This workshop is organized by project BALSAM and project COMRADE funded by the HFRI (Hellenic Foundation for Research and Innovation). The purpose of the workshop is to bring together leading experts and interested researchers in the fields of mechanism design and approximation algorithms and discuss about latest developments on the interaction between these two fields.
Recordings of the talks are now available: [Day1.Session1][Day1.Sessions2+3][Day2.Sessions1+2][Day2.Session3] (password: BaLSaM-CoMRaDE-2022).
Organizers
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Dimitris Fotakis, National Technical University of Athens, Greece
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Evangelos Markakis, Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece
Local Support: Georgios Papasotiropoulos (AUEB), Artem Tsikiridis (AUEB), Alkis Kalavasis (NTUA), Panagiotis Patsilinakos (NTUA)
Invited Speakers
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Georgios Amanatidis, University of Essex, UK
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Ioannis Caragiannis, Aarhus University, Denmark
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Vasilis Gkatzelis, Drexel University, USA
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Martin Hoefer, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Germany
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Aris Filos-Ratsikas, University of Liverpool, UK
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Guido Schaefer, Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI) and University of Amsterdam (UvA), the Netherlands
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Christos Tzamos, University of Wisconsin Madison, USA
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Carmine Ventre, King’s College London, UK
Program
All times below are in the GR timezone (which is CET +1).
| 11:45–12:00 | Welcoming and opening remarks (Webex meeting will be open even earlier) |
| 12:00–13:30 | Session 1
The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice Aris Filos-Ratsikas, University of Liverpool Imperfect Rationality in Mechanism Design Carmine Ventre, King’s College London |
| 13:30–14:30 | Lunch break |
| 14:30–15:30 | Session 2 - Research@AUEB (short talks)
Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction Artem Tsikiridis, AUEB Truthful Mechanisms for a Single-dimensional Spatial Model of Crowdsourcing Markets Georgios Papasotiropoulos, AUEB Forward Looking Best-Response Multiplicative Weights Update Methods for Bilinear Zero-sum Games Michail Fasoulakis, AUEB + FORTH |
| 15:30–16:00 | Coffee break |
| 16:00–17:30 | Session 3
Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching Ioannis Caragiannis, Aarhus University Corruption in Auctions: Social Welfare Loss in Hybrid Multi-Unit Auctions Guido Schaefer, CWI + UvA |
| 11:45–12:00 | Coffee, gossiping, etc |
| 12:00–13:30 | Session 1
Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication Martin Hoefer, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main Don't Roll the Dice, Ask Twice: The Two-Query Distortion of Matching Problems and Beyond Georgios Amanatidis, University of Essex |
| 13:30–14:30 | Lunch break |
| 14:30–15:30 | Session 2 - Research@NTUA (short talks)
Online and Approximation Algorithms for Min-Sum Set Cover Stratis Skoulakis, EPFL The Complexity of Equilibrium in Linear Weighted Congestion Games Thanasis Lianeas, NTUA Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances Panagiotis Patsilinakos, NTUA Efficient Algorithms for Learning from Coarse Labels Alkis Kalavasis, NTUA |
| 15:30–16:00 | Coffee break |
| 16:00–17:30 | Session 3
Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design Vasilis Gkatzelis, Drexel University Buy-Many Mechanisms are Not Much Better than Item Pricing Christos Tzamos, University of Wisconsin-Madison |
